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Abstract 
 
Human factors are emerging as the main concern for the oil and gas industry. All the major 
accidents in the offshore industry will have a direct cause or some way or the other linked to 
the human factors. The main aim of this thesis is to reduce the incidents due to human factors. 
In this thesis the commonly used methods Human Reliability Analysis and Barrier and 
Operational Risk Analysis are studied and their limitations are reviewed. 
A new approach Functional Resonance and Analysis Method (FRAM) is used to overcome all 
the limitations and manage the human factors based on the principle of Resilience 
engineering. 
FRAM is a risk assessment method used widely in the field of Aviation and air traffic 
management where high degree of precision and safety is required.  
A case study on Macondo Blowout is performed using the FRAM method to illustrate its 
functionality and also to explain how the accident could have been predicted and prevented 
from the disaster.  
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In the recent years offshore activates are increasing. More rigs are being built and 
in parallel life extension of older asserts also takes place. Exploration of new 
geographies and operations are carried out in deeper and colder water regions. 
Hence, we can also expect more incidents and accidents in the industry. Are the 
new technologies and modern operations and safety management systems 
becoming safer?  According to WOAD (World Offshore Accident Database) the 
number of incidents and accidents is increasing every year. The following figure 
shows the recent trends of accidents. 
 
Number of Accidents (DNV.GL, 2014) 
 
On the further look into the accidents it is clear that the Human Factors are one of 
the major causes of the accidents. According to (Hollnagel, 2008), 
 
 
Attributed cause of accidents (Hollnagel, 2008) 
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In the past lack of technological development was the main cause of the accidents 
as the technology became powerful and precise then came the organizational and 
human factors. in the recent year’s accidents due to technological defects are very 
less when compared to the incidents due to Human Factors as shown in the graph 
above. 
 
Human error is the major source of risk in the existing offshore systems. The 
international maritime organization and the U.S coast guard have estimated that 
human factors are the direct cause of nearly 80% of ship incidents and accidents. 
Chadwell et al (1999) investigated the role of human factors in the petroleum 
industry incidents which resulted to be 47% are due to these factors. Human factors 
are not only the main causes of incidents but also play a major role in financial 
losses due to production downtime, environmental damage or lost drilling time etc. 
Hence in the recent years Human factors are consider as an important topic in risk 
reduction in the organization. Several new methods are being developed and 
adapted by the organizations to reduce the risk due to Human factors. This 





The main purpose of this thesis is to recommend a new approach for managing the 
risk due to human factors. we will be studying the current approaches used for risk 
assessment of human factors, review them based on their limitations and their 
respective consequences. In the later part of the report we will be using a new 
method FRAM (Functional Resonance and Analysis Method) adapted from Aviation 
industry for overcoming the consequences of the current approaches of the oil and 
gas industry. A case study is carried on the Macondo Blowout accident and will be 
illustrating, how the key issues of the accident can be avoided or prevented using 
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2. UNDERSTANDING HUMAN FACTORS AND HUMAN ERRORS 
 
  Earlier in offshore industry, we often used these terms ‘Human Factors’ and 
‘Human Errors’ without the proper understanding of what these terms actually mean. They 
were just used as general terms referring as a cause of accidents which occurred due to 
people other than technical faults. Traditionally Human Factors were defined as the scientific 
study of human and machine interactions. In the recent years the definition of these terms 
were extended to encompass the effects on safety by an individual, group or by an 
organizational factor. 
 
  Both Human factors and the Human errors are studied separately and then 
if any relationship between them are overlooked, this might be due to no agreement between 
them on precise nature and definition. The following figure shows an illustration on the 
relationships between the human factors (underlying causes) and human errors (their 
immediate causes). 
    
 
Relationships between human factors and human errors (Gordon, 1998) 
 
3. HUMAN ERROR 
  
 Many industrial psychologists like Reason, Rasmussen Kontogiannis and Embrey 
studied in detail on human error whose findings plays a major role in understanding the 
human error. Reason categorized human errors based on theory of human performance by 
Rasmussen, in terms of  
 Skill based slips and lapses 
 Rule based mistakes 
 Knowledge based mistakes 
 
According to R.P.E Gordon reason’s error types are complex and in order to understand 
and use it on a regular basis we are in need of considerable training. 
 
Kontogiannis and Embrey summarized human errors in a more simplistic approach into six 
categories (Gordon, 1998) 
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1. Action Errors: Errors when wrong or no action taken or when correct actions under 
wrong situations or object. 
2. Checking Errors: The checks which are ignored or fault checks made or proper 
checks done on wrong objects or situation 
3. Retrieval Errors: Receiving incorrect information or absence of required 
information. 
4. Transmission Errors: Passing no information or incorrect information to the 
person. Or when the information is passed to a wrong personnel 
5. Diagnostic errors: In the occurrence of an unusual or abnormal events, 
misinterpreting the actual situation. 
6. Decision Errors: making wrong decisions considering the circumstances. 
 
              Reason’s ‘Skill based slips and lapses’ relates to the first two categories Action and 
Checking errors, ‘Rule based mistakes’ relates to retrieval and transmission errors and the 
‘Knowledge based mistakes’ relates to diagnostics and decision errors. 
 
                  Human Error Typology (NOPSEMA,2016) 
 
   Mistakes (NOPSEMA,2016) 
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3.1. Violations 
 
                 Violations refers to failure of applying a good rule. When an intentional 
action does not achieve desired outcome, then the violation is classified as human 
errors. 
 
Rule-based mistakes (NOPSEMA, 2016) 
 
There are several types of violation here we will discuss the major types, 
 
 Routine – routine violations are very common and committed by most of the 
personnel’s in the organization. 
 Unintentional – breaking a rule as it was misunderstood or misinterpreted. 
 Situational – as the name suggests it is not possible to get the job done in 
certain situations by following the rules 
 Exceptional – deviation from the rules under unusual circumstances. 
 
 
NOTE: When a violation achieves the desired outcome and does not cause any 
undesired outcomes it is not a human error. 
 
For example: During the piper alpha incident, the personnel who followed the muster 
procedures could not access the life boats from the accommodation block. Personnel 
who survived the disaster was those who violated the rules and decided to jump in the 
ocean. In such cases it is advisable to review the rules and procedures. 
 
Human errors are of two kinds in system disasters, 
 
Active errors: Errors which have immediate effect on the system. These errors are mainly 
caused by frontline operators (like production operators, control room crews) 
 
Latent errors: Errors whose consequences lie latent within the system, or comes into light 
only with the combination of other factors. These errors are caused mainly by the direct 
controlling personnel whose role has been already removed from the system (e.g. 
construction workers, designers, managers) 
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                If both active and latent errors are identified at the work site, focusing on the 
actual problem will be made possible and therefore we can understand the basics of an 
error or accident. 
 
4. HUMAN FACTORS  
           
                     In general the Human factors is defined as the interaction between the 
humans, equipments and the management systems or organisations (IOGP, 2005). 
 
 
Human factors interactions (IOGP, 2005) 
 
NOPSEMA defined human factors into three basic categories as  
 
 Organizational factors – includes the culture of the company, communication 
systems, decision making strategy, organizational priorities, availability of 
resources, leadership behavior, change management and relevant key 
performance indicators (KPI). 
 
 Job factors -  includes human-machine interface, physical working 
environment, availability and quality of procedures, workload, task 
requirements, equipment used and team member’s behavior.  
 
 Individual factors – includes personality, attitude, mood, mental ability, 
competence and skill, and individual health factors such as fatigue, alcohol 
and drugs, physical capability and psychological health 
 
Some of the major human factor issues in the maritime and offshore industry are 
 Leadership and safety culture 
 Communications risks 
 Perception of Risk and Decision-Making 
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 Fatigue 
 Human Factors in Design 
 Inadequate knowledge or training 
 Poor maintenance  
 Safety critical procedures 
 Commercial and contractual environment 
 Learning from incidents and accidents 
 
4.1. Leadership and safety culture 
 
Factors like attitude, shared values, beliefs and expectations which emphasize the 
critical importance of safety across any organization is highly influenced by the 
leadership and safety culture. The attitude towards the safety of an organization are 
determined by the factors like incentives and rewards implemented by leaders, 
behavior and interaction of the leaders with their personnel, decisions and actions 
taken by them to balance the safety against commercial imperatives. Safety culture 
cannot be changed abruptly but it is possible to have a gradual change by gauging its 
safety culture level and try to climb the ladder as shown below, 
 
Culture ladder (Energy Institute, 2011) 
 
4.2. Communication risks  
 
Communications can be done in any form right from speaking, or by using sign 
language, or in pictorial form, or by any computer presentation. But the main motive 
is to transfer the complete information accurately and precisely. The person who 
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communicates should be responsible to make sure the message was received and 
understood by the person. Communication risk are high during the shit handover. 
Accidents like Piper Alpha are caused by poor communications during shift handover. 
Risk of communication also relies on the open door policy, standardization of 
terminologies used across an organization. 
 
4.3. Perception of risk and decision making 
 
During a critical situation proper understanding of the risk is very important. Incorrect 
decisions without proper understanding of the risk involved can lead to major 
accidents. An example for right decision during piper alpha accident only the 
personnel who decided to jump in the sea survived the incident. There might be 
situations where one should decide whether follow the standard procedures or decide 





Fatigue is defined as feeling exhausted or tiredness and being ineffective in the work. 
Fatigue can be caused by excessive or prolonged exertion either by physical or mental 
exertion or by both. It is also a root cause for major incidents as a fatigued person is 
directly exposed to risk or making errors. Fatigue is mainly caused due to long shift 
hours, night working or frequent change of shifts. According to the energy institute 
briefing notes the risk are higher as the working hours increases. The average risks 
are nearly doubled when compared to working hours of 2-4 to 10-12.  
 




4.5. Human factors in design 
 
Design deficiencies or lack of interface between the people and the technology 
reduces the human performances. These factors are often referred as “design induced 
human error”. It more important for an organization to include human factors during 
the design process to ensure easy accessibility and suitable for local work conditions. 
Oil and gas industry have to improve lots in the field of human factors engineering 
design by learning from industries like aviation, defense and nuclear power. Oil and 
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gas industries are continuously working on developing standards and processes to 
customize the needs. Some of the design errors are 
 
 
Spacing congestion (IOGP, 2011) 
 
The above image shows the design error by poor spacing which intern makes it 
difficult to operate the valve. 
 
Difficulties in accessibility (IOGP, 2011) 
Followed international standards but failed to consider local work forces. 
 
4.6. Inadequate knowledge or training 
 
An employee’s knowledge, skill and experience are measured by his competency. 
The skills, knowledge and attitude can be acquired through proper training. For a safe 
operation it is important to have a competent personnel. It is always advisable to have 
suitably qualified and experienced person (SQEP) for risk prone operations. 
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4.7. Poor maintenance  
 
Poor maintenance is a major cause for fire and explosions. It may also result in 
hazardous work environment, lack of back-up systems required for emergency 
replacements. Maintenance tasks also includes the assurance of adequate supply of 
spare parts. According to the energy institute maintenance factors plays a major role 
in the root cause of many incidents. Cost cuttings in the organization is one of the 
main reason for poor maintenance. 
 
Number of reported injuries in offshore 2004-2008 (Energy Institute, 2011) 
 
4.8.  Safety critical procedures 
 
Safety critical procedures are instructions on how to carry out a job. It may be in any 
form on a paper or on a computer screen. If safety critical procedures are carried out 
incorrectly may lead to serious accidents or fatality. Providing clear and accurate 
procedures for operating is the most effective measure to mitigate such events. 
Operators should also make sure that the safety critical procedures are followed 
during an emergency. 
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4.9.  Commercial and contractual environment 
 
Operations in oil and gas industries are carried out in a complex environment which 
involves various stakeholders with different requirements, priorities and legal 
responsibilities. Decision making and communication is largely affected by these 
factors which may lead to serious consequences. The stakeholders must be aware of 
their responsibilities and contribution towards the safety of the oil and gas industry. 
 
4.10. Learning incidents and accidents  
 
Incidents and accidents occurs in spite of an organization having various preventive 
measures, tools and techniques to reduce failures. So it is mandatory that the 
organizations conduct’s routine investigation of incidents for better understanding of 
the human error and human factor failures. 
 
 
When these human factors are not managed effectively there are called Error-inducing 
factors. The interaction between and within these categories can be complex and difficult to 
manage. Management of human factors should not be delegated to managers or individual 
supervisors or to any safety personal. An integrated organizational approach is required to 
ensure that high level decisions do not create error inducing factors. In the upcoming sections 
we will be discussing the present approaches and their limitations. We will also be using a 
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5. Integrating human factors with Risk Analysis – Currently used 
methods. 
 
5.1. Risk Analysis 
 
Risk analysis is the central part of risk management. Risk analysis process can be 




 Problem definition, information gathering and organization of work 
 Selection of analysis method 
2. Risk assessment 
 Identification of initiating events (hazards, threats and opportunities) 
 Cause and consequences analysis 
 Risk picture 
3. Risk treatment 
 Comparing alternatives, identification and assessment of measures 
 Management review and judgement. Decision making.  
 
There are several methods available for integrating human factors with risk analysis in this 
report we will be discussing the commonly used Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) and 
newly developed Barrier and Operational Risk Analysis (BORA). The draw backs and 
limitations of these methods will be discussed for the need for a new alternate approach. 
5.2. Human Reliability analysis  
 
     Human reliability analysis (HRA) can be defined as the method to assess the 
impact of potential human errors on the proper functioning of a system composed of 
equipment and people. 
 
The primary functions of an HRA is  
 
 Human error identification 
 Human error quantification 
 Human error reduction 
 
Human reliability analysis integrates Human factors into risk analysis. The 
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Human factor Risk assessment 
Task analysis System analysis 
Human error identification Hazard identification 
Error representation Risk modelling 
Human error quantification Risk assessment 
Human error reduction Risk reduction 
 
Mapping Human factors with Risk Assessment 
 
The principal components of HRA are briefly explained below, 
 
i. Problem definition 
 
In problem definition the scope of HRA is to be determined, in general a set of 
key questions has to be answered in order to define the exact scope of HRA 
 Is HRA a part of PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) or is it a 
standalone assessment? 
 Will the maintenance errors, misdiagnoses, rule violations errors be 
considered? 
 If a quantified estimate of reliability is required? 
 Whether relative or absolute quantification is required? 
 What is the stage of system development? 
 What are the risk assessment criteria? 
 How extensive are the resources available? 
 Are there any existing HRA for this system? 
 Vulnerability of the system towards human error. 
 




ii. Task Analysis 
 
Task analysis refers to formally describing and analyzing human-system 
interactions. It defines the roles of the operators within the system in detail. A 
formal task analysis is a critical part in the problem definition stage as proper 
understanding the definition is more important for an analyst to predict the 
possible errors. task analysis is used to structure the operator’s further 
analysis similar to engineering flow diagrams, pipping and instrument 
diagrams which are used to define the various states of and operations 
involved by the engineers. Therefore, without the task analysis further HRA 
may not be reliable. 
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HRA process 
iii. Human error identification 
 
After completing the task analysis, in human error identification we consider 
what can go wrong. In this error identification process at the least the following 
types of error should be considered (Kirwan, 1994) 
 
 Error of omission – failing to carry out a required act 
 Error of commission -  act performed without precision or act 
performed in wrong sequence or act performed at wrong time 
 Extraneous act – unnecessary act performed instead or in addition to 
the required act 




Once the operators task is defined and the error is identified the very next step 
is to represent this information in a format which helps in the quantitative 
evaluation of the human error. Usually it is used to see the impact of the human 
error in the context of other potential contributions to system risk such as 
hardware and software failures. Recoveries and human errors are usually 
embedded within the logical systems like fault tree and event tree analysis to 
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v. Human error quantification 
 
The next step is to quantify the errors and to determine the overall effect of the 
human errors on the system reliability or system safety. There are several 
techniques to quantify the human error probabilities. 
 
𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟
 
 
vi. Impact assessment 
 
The overall system risk level can be calculated once the errors have been 
quantified and represented in the risk assessment logic trees. Then we have 
to determine whether the system has an acceptable level of risk or not. If the 
level of risk is unacceptably high, then either the system must be discontinued 
or the risk level must be reduced. 
 
vii. Error reduction analysis 
 
         Error reduction measures are derived in several ways 
 
 Identifying and changing the root causes of the error (from the error 
identification stage) 
 By altering the defined factors i.e. performance shaping factors 
 Or by using ergonomics or engineering judgement to assess the task 
again in its system context and redesigning it to reduce its likelihood or 
its impact on the system.  
If an error reduction measure is necessary to reduce the risk to an 
acceptable level, then the error reduction measure should be implemented 
and the system risk level have to be recalculated. In some cases, several 
iterations of error reduction methods may occur until acceptable risk 
factors are achieved. 
           
viii. Documentation and quality assurance 
 
Following the error reduction stage, the results will be documented. Quality 
assurance team should ensure that the required error reduction measure is 
effectively implemented and also if any assumptions are made during the 
analysis should ensure its validity throughout the life time of the system or the 
life time of HRA. 
 
A detailed procedure for HRA is explained by Barry Kirwan (1994).  
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5.3. Main Issues in HRA  
 
Human factors helps in the identification of the human performance issues and HRA 
helps to prioritize human factors issues based on risk. In many cases, Human 
Reliability Analysis is not matured enough to provide robust prioritization of issues. 
For example, in Oil and gas industry there are extensive list of human factors issues 
but in HRA there are no attempts to explain which of these issues is the most important 
in terms of risk. 
 
Other Important factors like fatigue and safety culture are not adequately addressed 
by HRA methods. 
 
Significant difference in quantitative results from different methods of HRA or by 
different analyst using same method. 
 
More reliance on the expert judgement, due to scarcity of empirical human 
performance data particularly for serious accident situations. 
 
No explicit account for the impact of organization and management aspects. 
 
Limiting accounts for dependencies among actions. These uncertainties may lead to 
serious consequences. 
 
The main issue is that the events are individually considered and the analysis is 
carried out separately for every individual events. Then the individual risk level is 
checked for the acceptance level and if it is lower than the acceptable level the risk is 
ignored. But in complex systems or complex situations risk of several events may 
couple and have serious effect on the system. HRA fails to show the dependencies of 
every events on the other events and their respective relationships. Hence the linear 
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5.4. BORA  
 
Offshore Quantitative risk analysis was traditionally a crude analysis of barrier 
performance stressing technical aspects on consequence reducing systems. PSA 
(Petroleum Safety Authority) on the road to more detailed analysis reflecting operating 
factors, initiated a new technique Barrier and Operational Risk Analysis. 
 
The main aim of the project is to create a detailed and quantitative model of barrier 
performance, including the barriers for preventing the occurrence of initiating events 
as well as the barriers for reducing the consequences. The work was carried out to 
create a basic structure for barriers and barrier elements, considering the following 
barriers as the starting point, 
 
 Prevent loss of containment 
 Prevent ignition 
 Reduce cloud/emissions 
 Prevent escalation 
 Prevent fatalities 
 
5.4.1. BORA methodology 
 
BORA an approach for incorporating organizational, Operational and human 
factors in QRA consists of six steps: 
 
i. Developing a basic risk model 
ii. Assigning average industrial frequency or probabilities of basic events and 
initiating events. 
iii. Identification of RIFs (Risk Influential factors) and developing a risk 
influence diagrams. 
iv. Assessing the status of RIFs 
v. Calculating average industrial frequencies or probabilities of basic events 
and initiating events. 
vi. Calculating installation specific risk by incorporating the effect of various 
factors like technical systems, technical conditions, operating conditions, 
human factors and organizational factors. 
 
i. Development of a basic risk model 
 
The building blocks of BORA model are barrier block diagrams, fault trees 
and influence diagrams. Barrier block diagram consist of initiating events, 
barriers to influence the sequence of events in desired direction and 
possible outcomes of sequential events. It is used to illustrate events 
scenario and the effects of the barrier systems. Quantitative analysis of 
the scenario is performed with the help of event tree analysis. Fault tree 
is used to analyze the performance of safety barriers. And the influence 
diagram is used to analyze the effect of RIFs in initiating events of event 
tree and basic events in fault tree. 
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ii. Assignment of average frequencies or probabilities 
 
The basic step in quantification is to assign industry average frequencies 
for all initiating events and basic events in the event tree and fault tree 
respectively. These data can be found in generic databases or internal 
company databases. These probabilities can also be established by using 
an expert judgement. 
 
iii. Qualitative risk influence modeling 
 
The main moto of the RIF analysis is assigning each initiating events and 
barrier system with platform specific failure probabilities based on the 
different status of RIFs. Due to its complexity a combined approach is 
preferred to develop RIFs  
 Top down approach - generic list of Risk Influencing factors is used 
as a basis  
 Bottom up approach – events are chosen as a starting point 
 
According to (Vinnem, Aven, Hauge, Seljelid, & Veire, 2004) following 
groups of RIFs are considered 
 
 Personal characteristics 
 Task characteristics 
 Characteristics of the technical system 
 Administrative control 




RIFs for each initiating events and basic events in the event tree and fault 
tree should be identified. The number of RIFs should be limited to a 
maximum of 6 or lower for every event. During this process input from 
operational personnel is important to identify the important RIFs. 
 
Influence diagrams are used to analyze the effect of RIFs on both the 
initiating and basic events. 
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HMI (labels, alarms, ergonomic factors) 














Management of changes 
RIFs within different groups (Vinnem, Aven, Hauge, Seljelid, & Veire, 2004) 
 
iv. Scoring of RIFs  
Regarding the scoring of RIFs two options are proposed in BORA 
 By using the results from existing projects like MTO investigation 
of incidents, TTS (Technical condition Safety). TTS project is a 
method to map and monitor the safety levels based on the status 
of various safety barriers and safety critical elements, and scores 
are given to each system according to predefined performance 
standards.  
 
 Scoring scheme will be developed for each status of RIF on the 
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Rating Description of safety level 
A Condition is significantly better than the reference level 
B Condition is in accordance with the reference level 
C 
Condition satisfactory, but does not fully comply with the 
reference level 
D 
Condition is acceptable and within the statutory regulation’ 
minimum intended safety level, but deviates significantly 
from the reference level 
E 
Condition with significant deficiencies as compared with 
“D” 
F Condition is unacceptable 
                Definition of grades in TTS project (Vinnem, Aven, Hauge, Seljelid, & Veire, 2004) 
 
Score 
Grade characteristics for the RIF 
procedures 
A 
Almost perfect procedures, with checklists, highlighting 
of important information, illustration, etc., 
B Procedure better than industry average 
C Industry average procedures 
D Poorly written procedure and no highlighting  
E 
Procedure incomplete, out-of-date, inaccurate much 
cross-referencing etc., 
F No procedures, even though the task demands them  
                      Scoring scale for RIF procedures (Vinnem, Aven, Hauge, Seljelid, & Veire, 2004) 
 
During practical assessments both these approaches may be combined. 
 
v. Calculation of installation specific frequencies or probabilities 
 
The main purpose of this task is to adjust the average industrial probability 
based on the scoring of the RIFs. Here the three main aspects are 
discussed 
 Formulas for calculating installation specific probability or 
frequencies 
 Assigning appropriate values for Qis 








    Master Thesis – Spring 2016                                                                                                              Page | 21  
Let A be the failure event, Prev(A) be the installation specific probability of 
event A 
 





 . 𝑄𝑖 
 
Where, 
  Pave = industry average probability 
    Wi = weight / importance of RIFi for the event 
     Qi = measure of status of RIFi 








Therefor the main challenge is to determine the appropriate values of Qi 
and Wi  
 
Determining appropriate values of Qi  
 
To determine the values of Qis we need to associate specific numbers to 
each score A-F. 
 
Plow is the lower limit for Prev, determined by expert judgement 
Phigh is the upper limit for Prev determined by expert judgement  
  











   𝑖𝑓  𝑆𝑖 = 𝐴
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑖 = 𝐶
𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑒
 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑖 = 𝐹
 
 
Where Si denotes the score of RIFi  
 
To determine the weight of Wi generally it is started by assigning 
weightage 10 to the most important RIFi and relative weights are assigned 
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vi. Recalculating the installation specific risk 
 
By using the platform specific data Prev  as a input we calculate the revised 
value for the installation specific risk using the risk model. We also 
consider the organizational factors, human factors, operational conditions, 
technical conditions and the technical systems on the platform during the 
revised risk values. 
 
 
5.5. Limitations of BORA – Need for an resilient approach 
 
Risk Influencing Factors (RIFs) are not independent always they will influence each 
other, hence it is better to have a clear picture of the relationships of RIFs. 
 
RIFs are not clearly defined. RIFs are the factors that may influence the probability of 
an event occuring. RIFs are not barriers but they the factors which influences the 
performances of the barriers and other external factors. According to this, it is difficult 
to distinguish between the RIFs and barriers. 
 
According to Hollnagel apidemiological models are still following the principles of 
sequential model as the direction of causality are in a linear fasion eg swiss cheese 
model. The barrier block diagrams are similar to the swiss cheese model which shows 
the direction of causality in linear fasion. But for complex situation or systems the 
defects are often transienteg the holes in the swiss cheese are moving continuously. 
 
 
Swiss Cheese model (Reason, 1997) 
 
Similar to RIFs the barriers are not independent to each other. For example in a gas 
leakage incident the barriers are pressure detection, alarm detection, human 
inspection etc. the barrier human inspection cen influence the other barriers. If the 
human inspection is carried earlier than the other barriers then it influences the 
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BORA seems simple in theory but it is complicated in operation. The block diagram is 
drawn for every possible initial events, for instatnce in a drilling process the are several 
intial events and each event can be drawn a barrier. Hence  for the entire operations 
the number of block diagrams are not imaginable. Hence in complex systems drawing 




Need for a Resilient approach 
 
As dicussed explained above, both the HRA and BORA doesnot establish a 
relationship model of the events or functions for better understanding of the problem. 
These approaches cosiders asingle event at a time and if the risk level are moderate 
and acceptable the event is considered to be safe. But when this events with low 
probability couples with various other events it leads to an incident or accident. 
 
As we all know accident are not because of a single cause or incident eg piper alpha, 
Macondo blowout etc., it is a combinations of various causes. Hence understanding 
the relationship of the functions and their dependencies place a major role in 
preventing of accidents.  
 
In order to over come these difficulties I have a recommended an approach for risk 
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6. Resilience engineering 
 
6.1.  What is resilience engineering? 
 
“Resilience is the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or 
following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations under both 
expected and unexpected conditions” (Hollnagel, 2008) 
 
 
6.2. Scope of resilience 
 
Traditionally safety was the focus on what could go wrong, or what went wrong. This 
was sensible because an enterprise has to understand what went wrong as well as 
what may go wrong in order to develop preventive measures against the event or its 
outcomes. The traditional risk matrix illustrates the above line of thinking. The example 






The risk matrix is generally based on the risk level of the possible outcomes with their 
probability of occurrence and their severity of the consequences. The risk matrix looks 
only at things that might go wrong but when considering the possible outcomes of an 
event it can go right as well as wrong. It therefore reasonable to expect the things 
which normally go positive can also be expected to go wrong in an unusual way. In 
this perspective it is advisable to include both the positive and negative outcome of 
the consequences i.e. all possible outcomes as shown in the figure (possible 
outcomes). 








Traditionally safety was focusing on negative outcomes which has very low 
probabilities of occurrence such as accidents and incidents. The unwanted negative 
outcomes like mishaps are generally eliminated. While considering a simple relation 
between the event and their outcomes, it is possible to characterize several subsets 
of the outcome as, 
 
 Positive outcomes with a high probability of occurrence. This subset consists 
of success or the events that not only turns positive but are also intended and 
expected to be positive. It is highly predictable that chances of something 
going wrong is very less. 
 
 Positive outcomes with low probability of occurrence. This subset represents 
the positive things that can happen, but unexpectedly. 
 
 Negative outcomes which have very low probability of occurrence i.e. things 
which go wrong unexpectedly but not unimaginable outcomes. This subset 
represents the outcomes that are serious and hard to predict. This includes 
the common category of incidents and accidents. 
 
 Negative outcomes with a high probabilities of occurrence, these outcomes 
are expected to occur regularly. In practice these outcomes have a minor 
consequence as they would have been eliminated, for example using ALARP 
principle. These outcomes are commonly called as near misses or unsafe 
actions or almost accidents. The subset mishaps i.e. near misses with serious 
consequences which is predictable are normally assumed that it would have 
been eliminated. 
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In order to know about the traditional and current safety scenario we have a proper 
understanding of Safety I and Safety II 
 
6.2.1. Safety I things that go wrong 
 
Historically, the starting point of safety has been the occurrence of actual adverse 
outcomes (accidents) or potential adverse outcomes (recognized risks). Things 
that go wrong i.e. adverse outcomes are usually explained by the predictable 
cause and their Reponses to either contain them or to eliminate them. New types 
of accidents if any have been accounted similarly by introducing new causes such 
as human factors or technology defects. As this was effective in providing short 
term solutions, for centuries we have been explaining accidents in terms of cause 
effect relations. unfortunately, persistence of the deficiencies will not be explained 
by just seeing on the hindsight of the deficiencies.   
 
Consequences of defining safety by adverse outcome (what can go wrong) is 
illustrated as follows, consider the following figure 
 




The probability of the things can go wrong is as thin line as shown in red colour 
is 1 out of 10000 events this indicates that the probability of things can go right 
is 9999 out of 10000 events.  
 
Safety-I always focus on what went wrong, numerous methods explain what went 
wrong or methods to find the failure components are explained in numerous 
models. The general solution is look for malfunctions or failures and try to 
eliminate their causes or to introduce barriers or both, it is called as Find and Fix. 
 
It is quite different situation for the events that go right, they are usually given very 
less attention in the safety management activities like risk assessment and safety 
assurance. There are no regulations from the authorities to monitor what goes 
right. It is assumed in Safety-I that the things that go right and things go wrong 
have different causes and happens in different ways. 
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Failures and success according to Safety-I  
 
 
Safety by eliminating and preventing  
 
Safety is by eliminating the way of malfunctions and preventing the way of going right with 
the help of barriers is shown above Safety-I. It also assumes that the components of the 
system are bimodal in functioning i.e. it has two modes of functioning either performing 
correctly or malfunctioning.  
 
6.2.2. Safety-II things go right 
 
Unlike Safety-I, in resilience engineering instead of looking only at things which 
go wrong, things which go right should also be considered and understand how it 
happens. It is acknowledged that things go right because the workers are able to 
adjust to the conditions and work accordingly rather than work as imagined. It 
also acknowledges that both the outcomes (acceptable and not acceptable) have 
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Basics of safety -II  
 
According to resilience engineering failures are not treated as a unique individual 
events, it is seen as an expression of everyday variability in performance. It is a 
safe consideration as the things that goes wrong has been right several times 
before and will also go right in the future. 
 
 
Understanding variability of everyday performance 
 
Safety-II is ability to function as required in varying conditions, to bring the number 
of acceptable outcomes as high as possible. Therefore, proper understanding of 
everyday activities is very much necessary to understand why things go right. 
Proactive approach of safety management is required so to intervene before 
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6.3. Four corner stones of resilience 
The main goal of resilience engineering is to achieve resilience in a system. For an 
organization to be resilient it has to possess four essential abilities11  
 Ability to respond 
 
A resilient organization should be able to respond i.e. know what to do during 
regular and irregular disruptions either by responding with prepared set of 
responses or by adjusting the normal functionality. It is the ability to respond or 
knowing what to do. This ability to address is called as actual. 
 
 Ability to monitor 
 
A resilient organization should be able to monitor i.e. Knowing what to look for 
that can bring threats to the system. The act of monitoring should cover what 
is happening in the system, its environment and its own performance. This 
ability to address is called as critical. 
 
 Ability to learn   
 
A resilient organization must be able to learn from its experience. In particular, 
it should know how to learn right lessons from right experiences including both 
success and failures. This ability to address is called as factual. 
 
 Ability to anticipate 
 
A resilient organization should be able to anticipate i.e. to know what to expect 
like threats, developments and opportunities in the future. This ability to 




Abilities of resilience engineering 
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All the four abilities are essential for an organization to be resilient.  Resilience engineering 
ensures that all the abilities cannot be considered individually or independently. Resilience 
engineering approach is currently used in fields like air traffic control systems where high 
safety standards are followed. The advantages of resilience engineering approach over 
safety management and safety culture based on some general categories and 
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6.4. Resilience engineering risk perspective  
 
Resilience engineering is an important field for understanding and managing safety in 
socio-technical systems. Various efforts have been made in the recent years to 
provide a suitable clarification and concepts for a resilient system. The key points to 
understand a resilient system are 
 
 Unacceptable events cannot be attributed to malfunctioning of components or 
breakdown. They are understood as an unexpected combinations of normal 
performance variability. 
 According to resilience engineering effective safety management is not based 
on hindsight or failure probability calculation nor on error tabulation. Safety 
management must be proactive not just reactive. 
 In conventional view on safety management, performance variability is 
considered as a threat or something that should be avoided. They are 
constrained by means of barriers, rules, interlocks and procedures. 
 Performance variability is normal and essential in resilience engineering. It is 
considered as the source of both negative and positive outcomes. Constraining 
performance variability cannot will not lead to safety, instead reinforce the 
performance variability leading to positive outcomes. 
 
For an organization to be resilient it must have the following four abilities 
 Ability to respond to regular and irregular threats. 
 Ability to monitor, know what is going on 
 Ability to anticipate risk and opportunities 
 Ability to learn from experience 
 
In order to formulate a risk perspective for resilience engineering we have to 
understand the basic risk perspective. Two main categories of risk perspective are 
 
 Probability is considered as the main component of risk and it is interpreted as 
an objective probability of an activity. It is referred as the traditional risk 
perspective. 
 Uncertainty is the main component of the risk and probability is a subjective 
tool (knowledge based) for expressing these uncertainties. This is referred to 
alternative perspective of risk. 
 
In traditional risk perspective, risk is defined by probability distribution or by 
probabilities expressing stochastic uncertainties. Probability P is defined as the 
fraction of times the event A occurs. The probability distribution Px is associated with 
X a random variable. Here the risk is defined by P and Px, uncertainties are often 
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In alternative risk perspective uncertainty is the main component not probability. 
According to Aven risk perspective it is two dimensional combination 
i. An event A and its consequences C 
ii. And the associated uncertainties U 
 
It is commonly referred to (A, C, U) perspective, the risk associated with an activity is 
understood as  
Uncertainty about and severity of the consequences of an activity (Steen & Aven, 2011) 
The uncertainties are described using the subjective probabilities P based on 
knowledge K. If probability P is said to be 0.1 it means that according to his/her degree 
of belief the probability of an event A, drawing a random ball from an urn containing 
10 balls is 1. This risk perspective includes the following elements (A, C, P, U, K). 
According to alternate perspective the probability is just a tool to express uncertainties. 
 
Risk perspective for resilience engineering 
 
The basics used here is (A, C, U) risk perspective explained above. In order to 
introduce define resilience we introduce a concept of vulnerability (Steen & Aven, 
2011) 
 
Vulnerability or robustness = (C, U|A) 
 
The vulnerability is defined as a two dimensional combination of C consequences and 
its associated uncertainties U, given occurrence of event A. The uncertainties of 
various consequences C can also be defined by the probability K of occurrence of the 
event A. thus the vulnerability is also defined using the following elements (Steen & 
Aven, 2011) 
 
Vulnerability = (C, P, U, K|A) 
 
Where C is consequence, P probability, U uncertainty and K background knowledge 
given that the event A takes place. Vulnerability analysis is a part of risk analysis since 
vulnerability is considered as an aspect of risk. 
 
Resilience is a closely related concept of robustness. The key difference is the event 
A, the consequences C and the Uncertainties are related to a fixed A in robustness 
and vulnerability. Where as in resilience engineering the event A is open to any type 
of event. Therefore, resilience can be defined as (Steen & Aven, 2011) 
 
Resilience (C, U| any A, including new types of A) 
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For all the above definitions, consequences C depends on the performances of 
barriers B, to show this explicitly we write C = (B, C) resulting in describing resilience 
as (B, C, P, U, K| any A, including new types of A) 
 
The performances of the barriers are expressed by the capacity of the barrier. In 
general performance influencing factors (PIFs) influences the performances of the 
system and the barriers. 
 
All the measures carried out to manage resilience is called as the resilience 
engineering. The risk assessment following the risk perspectives (C, P, U, K| Any A, 
including new types of A) is referred to as extended risk assessments. 
 
The main elements of an extended risk Assessment are (Steen & Aven, 2011) 
 
 Identifying initiating events, A 
 
 Cause analysis 
 
 Expressing vulnerability (C, P, U, K|A) i.e. Vulnerability analysis 
 
 Resilience analysis expressing (C, P, U, K| Any A, including new types of A) 
 
 Risk description and characterization 
 
Here the term cause refers to the events and conditions leading to a specific outcome i.e. the 
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7. Resilience Engineering Approach to Risk Assessment (FRAM 
Method) 
 
FRAM method describes the systems failure as result of a functional resonance from the 
variability of normal performance. This is a model or a representation of organizational 
and/or individual functions where the characteristics of every function provides the basis 
for describing its potential variability. It was first proposed by Hollnagel 2004, since then it 
is used in various domains such as aviation, Air Traffic Management, healthcare. FRAM 
method can be used as accident investigation model to find where these coincidences may 
have arisen, as well as in risk assessment to explain how coincidences may arise from the 
performance variability.  
 
7.1.  Principles of FRAM 
 
The FRAM has a clear articulated theoretical basis, explained in the following four 
principles  
 
 The principle of equivalence of success and failures 
 
 The principle of approximate adjustments  
 
 The principle of emergence 
 
 The principle of functional resonance 
 
 
Principle of equivalence of success and failures 
 
        Principle of equivalence of success and failures can be summarized into the 
following points 
 
i. Both failures and normal performance are an emergent phenomena and are 
from a common source 
ii. The outcomes or result of the actions may differ from that was required, 
intended or expected these differences can be either harmful or beneficial. 
iii. The flexibility and adaptability of human work is the main reason for its 
efficiency. 
iv. However, the adaptability and flexibility of the human can also be the reason 
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The inevitability of approximate adjustments 
 
The variability of a system’s normal functioning in a systemic perspective is due to two 
basic facts 
 
 Usually the operating conditions are underspecified rarely, if ever, as 
imagined or as prescribed.  This is a consequence of intractability in socio-
technical systems. This means that it is practically impossible to prepare in 
advance, a set of instructions that can be followed later. The best possible 
solution is to provide guidelines that can be used as a basis for concrete 
actions. Guidelines and procedure are generally supported by extensive 
professional training. 
  
 Second, that the operating conditions more or less changes dynamically in an 
orderly manner. Hence it is impossible to prepare a precise procedure in 
advance. Therefore, the people who are supposed to act in the situation be 
managers or operators can plan for a short term. They must be always ready 
to revise their plans and adjust the plan implementation matching the current 
conditions. 
 
Consequences are emergent 
 
The variability of normal performance can rarely be large enough to be the cause of a 
malfunction or an accident itself. But the variability combines in an unexpected way 
from multiple functions leading to disproportionally large consequences, hence 
producing non-linear effects. Hence both normal performance and failures are 
considered to be emergent rather than resultant phenomena, since neither of them 




FRAM method replaces the traditional cause-effect relationship with the principle of 
resonance. By focusing on the relationship between system functions FRAM 
overcomes the limitations of established methods. This principle means that the 
variability of number of functions can resonate every now and then, this means that 
there is a possibility of the variability of one function reinforce with other leading to 
exceed the normal limits. Of course the outcome can be advantageous as well as 
detrimental. This principle makes possible to capture the dynamics of the system 
functioning, therefore the emergent system properties that is hard to understand is 
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7.2. Description of the FRAM method 
 
The method comprises of five steps 
 
 The first step is to define the purpose of the analysis as the FRAM can be 
developed for both accident investigation and as well as safety assessment. 
 
 The second step is to identify and describe the system functions. In FRAM 
terms, a function constitutes an activity which has necessary consequences 
for the state of another action. 
 
 The third step is assessing and evaluating the potential variability of every 
singular function. The methodology uses a priori assessment of set of 
Common Conditions (CCs) that have an influence on the performance 
variability. The CCs are derived from Common Performance Conditions (CPC) 
described by Hollnagel. This evaluation must be integrated with retrospective 
information extracted from various accident database to the extent of available 
data.  
 
 The fourth step Is to identify the functional resonance. The main aim is to 
determine all possible ways in which a variability of a single functions spreads 
in the system and how it combines with the variability of other systems 
 
 The last step is to identify the effective counter measures to be introduced in 
the system. In FRAM perspective the main aim of the counter measure is 
damping the performance variability and maintain a safe state in the system. 
But it is also consistent with the principle of resilience engineering which 
considers to amplify the functional resonance that leads to the desired 
outcomes. 
 
The outline of how FRAM can be used in risk assessment of an organizational 
change is discussed in the following 
 
Step 1: purpose of the analysis 
 
The very first step is to identify the purpose of the analysis, as mentioned 
earlier FRAM can be used as a safety assessment method as well as an 
accident investigation method. Although major steps are same in both the 
methods, but some of the required details needed may vary in both the cases. 
For example, in accident investigation performance conditions are well known, 
where as in future conditions it has to estimated. In the present description the 
focus is on looking into possible future events i.e., focus is on risk assessment 
of an organizational change. Once this objective is achieved the following 
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Step 2: Identification and Description of relevant system functions 
 
System identification and description of the system functions takes place in the 




Once the modelling level and its focus is determined, the next step is to identify 
the system functions. The principles that guide this is the need for achieving a 
description of normal activities performed by the socio technical system is 
being analyzed. Therefore, it is necessary to describe the functions without 
judging the possible quality or correctness of their outputs. The identification 
of functions is useful to start from task analysis or from the official documents 
of the organization. The function identification process is very essential in 
assuring the quality of resulting system modelling.  
 
Once the initial function identification is done the next step is characterization 
of each functions. This does not prevent that the set of functions is modified at 




Following the function identification, it proceeds by characterization of each 
function in terms of six parameters, 
 
1. Input (I): that which the function process starts the function or 
transformed to produce the output 
2. Output (O): that which is the result of the function it can be either a 
product or specific output or a state change. 
3. Preconditions (P): systems conditions that has to be fulfilled before a 
function can be carried out. 
4. Resources (R): that which the function consumes or needs to produce 
the output. 
5. Time(T): temporal constraints affecting the function (duration, starting 
time or finishing time) 
6. Control (C): how the function is monitored or controlled.  
 
 
The basis for the further analysis is the description of each function that is 
made in a simple table format. The representation is a diagram showing 
functions in hexagons and the connections between them as lines. Unlike 
event tree and fault tree the analysis is made on the basis of descriptions of 
the functions rather than the basis of the diagram. 
 
 










FRAM model differs from the classical models like event tree and fault tree by 
the fact that it is not a diagram or flowchart but the description of the functions 
in terms of the six characteristics or aspects. Classical models like event trees 
and fault analysis show only a single representation of a system, which focus 
on one set of possible cause effect relations. But in FRAM model no such 
constraints exists.  
 
There will always be a straight forward description of the six aspects or 
parameters but in the spirit of the method it can always be refined at a later 
stage of the analysis. On completion the tabular description defines a set of 




Once the functions have been described the very next step is to identify the 
couplings among the functions. This can be achieved by linking the functions 
in accordance with the descriptions provided by the tables. The result 
constitutes the FRAM installation of a system and is often represented 
graphically. 
 
In FRAM installation the link represents the dependencies among the functions 
defined by the six aspects rather than the causal flow or cause effect relations.  












Example of FRAM installation (Hollnagel, 2011) 
 
Step 3: Assessment of potential performance variability 
 
 
In FRAM the variability of function is affected by performance conditions, in the 
sense performance variability will be increased by adverse performance 
conditions whereas the advantageous performance conditions will reduce the 
performance variability. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the nature 
and origin of the performance for this change in perspective to be practically 
useful. 
 
In addition to the variability from habitual or intentional performance 
adjustments, it also the result of a number of external and internal factors. The 
six main sources of organizational and human performance variability are. 
 
1. Fundamental human psychological and/or physiological 
characteristics. Example – vigilance and attention, refractory periods, 
forgetting, fatigue etc. 
2. Pervasive psychological phenomena of higher level like creativity, 
ingenuity and adaptability, for an example overcoming temporal 
constraints and under specification. 
3. Organizational conditions and requirements 
4. Social or team psychological factors, such as complying with group 
working standards, etc. 
5. Ambient working conditions 
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6. Work environment variability induced by unpredictability of the domain. 
 
The detail explanation of common conditions and performance variability as a 
function of performance conditions and also performance variability of specific 
functions are provided by (Hollnagel,2013). 
 
 
Identification of functional resonance 
 
In FRAM, the variability of a function can have two different ways of 
consequences. One is through the quality of a function’s output. This is, 
analogous to various possible failure modes of an output. i.e. the in which 
output differs from what it was intended or expected. The failure modes can 
be characterized as shown below, 
 
 
Dimension of failure modes 
 
The evaluation of downstream influence of the variability of a function is 
supported by the characterization of the outputs in terms of failure modes. For 
an example, if the output of a function comes too late, then it will be resulting 
in reduction of the time for the following functions to produce their output. 
 
Other way is that the variability of a function can have consequences such that 
the performance variability may lead to change in one or more CCs. Increased 
variability may result in increased use of resources, may increase the number 
of goals or reduce the available time. This makes possible for accounting direct 
coupling among functions as well as the influence on common performance 
conditions (CPCs). In practice it can be too complex for this to be done 
manually and determining the propagation of variability, therefore it should be 
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Identification of effective countermeasures 
 
Once the possible range of performance variability and the potential risks are 
identified obviously the next and final step is to determine the 
countermeasures for either mitigating or eliminating those risks. Where there 
is a case in which the risk can be eliminated by changing something or any 
other means it should be done since prevention is the most effective solution. 
In the cases where the risk cannot be eliminated by changing something then 
other solutions should be considered. 
 
In functional perspective one should also consider solutions that directly 
address the dynamics of the system i.e. the way in which functions are carried 
out. If the risk is associated with the performance variability of either from a 
single function or through the couplings of various functions the logical solution 
is to dampen the variability. Dampening can be achieved in various ways it 
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8. Case study  
 
8.1.  Deepwater Horizon - Macondo Blow Out 
 
Deep water horizon a drilling rig which was stationed in the Gulf of Mexico for an 
exploratory drilling on the Macondo well. Deepwater Horizon is a mobile and 
temporary rig which drills the well and identifies if any viable reservoir of hydrocarbons 
and makes it ready and safe for a permanent production rig. This process involves 
drilling a deep bore hole in stages, inserting steel tubes and filling the casing with the 
cement. 20 April 2010, was an unforgettable day in the history of offshore oil and gas 
industry on which the world’s largest offshore oil spill occurred with a total of 11 
fatalities – The Macondo blowout. Complete accident report by BP (British Petroleum) 




The accident report concludes that the accident was not caused by a single action, it 
was result of a complex interaction of human judgements, mechanical failures, 
engineering design, team communication and operational implementation. The 
accident sequence is so complex where several barriers where breached. The 
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8.2. FRAM Safety Analysis – Macondo Blowout 
 
A simple illustration of the FRAM model is explained by considering the Macondo 
blowout is discussed below. 
 
Identification of essential system functions and characterization of each 
function based on six parameters 
 
Exploration and production process involves a large number of companies working on 
the platforms according to their specialties. In deep water horizon the primary 
companies involved were Transocean (platform owner), Halliburton (supplier of 
cementing services) and British petroleum (operator). For a better focus on the 
analysis functions which are directly involved during the time of accident are studied. 
However, for deeper analysis we have to consider the entire exploration and 
production process. We have focused on the main functions Drilling, cement 
Placement Temporary Abandonment. Drilling is the function of drilling wells with the 
support of geological and geophysical studies. The drilling mud is used as a coolant 
during the drilling process. Monitoring the volume and density of the mud is necessary 
for avoiding problems in formation and removing the drilling waste. During this activity 
invasion of hydrocarbons can occur in the well hence control measures should be 
taken by controlling the mud pressure or by using safety valves.  
 
Following the drilling activity comes cement placement, Here the drilling column is 
removed and a steel tube insulation is inserted. The gap between the steel tube and 
the formation is injected with a special cement.  
 
Temporary abandonment includes testing of the well, sealing ad safety devices and 
also disconnected from the platform so that the well, for future production from the 
well. In the case of deep water horizon disaster occurred before the temporary 
abandonment could be achieved. 
 
Assessment and evaluation of the potential variability considering normal and 
worst case situations 
 
Deepwater horizon has geological and geophysical studies as inputs for the drilling 
function. These studies might have variation, incompleteness and inaccuracy of the 
information. However, this can be eliminated or the process can be made resilient by 
continuous analysis of the drilling wastes that return from the well and make necessary 
corrections.  
 
Time delays are another main source of performance variation, as organizations main 
goal is to achieve the target on time for better profits it pressurizes the workers to 
compromise on the performances including safety issues. 
 
Pressure test results plays a major role in the performance variations as the fault 
readings and misinterpretation of data can have serious effect on the variations. The 
main aim of cement placement is to isolate the well from the invasion of hydrocarbons 
and ensure its safety on future operations.  
 
                   A Resilience Engineering Approach for Preventing Accidents due to Human Factors 
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Performance variations in the cement slurry may result in the weakening of the cement 
providing room for the invasion of hydrocarbons or fractures in the formation. 
Additional cement slurry test is performed to assess the formulation of the cement. 
These tests are carried out in a well-equipped laboratory located outside the platform 
and the results are stored in a database. These test are performed by a specialized 
company which have no contact with the platform. This test can play a major role in 
making the process more resilient by establishing a proper procedure for 
communication of the results to stakeholders and by predefining preventive and 
corrective measures with the team involved. Cementing correction is one of the main 
action to be taken in the case of detecting a performance variation. 
 
Temporary abandonment activity is assessing the integrity of the well and seal it for 
the future exploration. The main objective is to isolate the well for safe operations. 
Performance variations can be detected during the well abandonment testing, 
providing preventive and corrective actions can make the process resilient. Generally, 
checklists and procedures are provided to review the results or the process to detect 
the variations. Operators must also be trained to notice the variations that are not 
included in the checklists. 
 
Identification of functional resonance. The combinations of variability may 
result in undesirable outputs 
 
The combination of the variations in the performance aspects of cement placement 
plan and cement slurry design can have a serious consequence in the process of 
cement placement. A fragile cement due to the performance variation of both the 
activities may lead to the consequences of invasion of the hydrocarbons possibly an 
uncontrollable situation. To prevent the oil spill we can use safety devices like Blowout 
Preventers. But it is clear that the performance Variations in blowout Preventers 
makes the process less resilient. 
 
The FRAM approach as shown in the connection diagram represents all the 
relationships and dependencies of each function on the other, hence the effect on the 
function’s performance by the performance variation of other functions can be easily 
identified and the consequences can be reduced. 
 
Thus the proposed approach detects all the performance variations in the process and 
predicts the possibility of the accident in far advance situations. Hence an incident or 
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9. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 
From various accident reports it is evident that the human factors are the main causes of 
an incident or system failures. In the recent years organizations consider human factors 
as one of the major issue and have started to implement various measures to reduce risk 
due to human factors, but still the industries finds it difficult to control the risk. There several 
methods available to reduce the risk due to human factors but still the industry need more 
effective and reliable techniques to manage these risks. 
 
In the commonly used methods like HRA, BORA etc., the main aim is to detect the risk, 
perform a quantitative analysis and check whether the risk is at acceptable level or if it is 
of high risk level risk reduction methods are used. This procedure is repeated for several 
times until the risk is reduced to an acceptable level. But in practical reducing any risk to 
zero is nearly impossible. It is very important to understand that risk due to human factors 
and human error are inevitable. 
 
It also clear that the common risk assessment methods like HRA etc., the risk assessment 
is made for each event separately and checked for risk levels and if the risk levels are low 
and acceptable the risk is considered to be safe. But when two or more risk gets coupled 
with each other then the resulting risk is high and may have serious consequences and 
lead to accident. These methods fail to predict these risk or establish the relationship 
between these events. 
 
Humans are prone to make mistakes and will err in their judgement. They will also drift 
from the known procedures; these drifts are normal but if not managed properly it can have 
a cumulative negative effect on the overall process. 
 
Resilience engineering is the best possible approach for overcoming all the above 
problems. Performance variability in resilience engineering view both normal and failure 
performances have a common source. The outcomes may sometime differ from what was 
required, expected or intended. This difference can be either beneficial or harmful. The 
adaptability and flexibility of the human performance is the reason for the efficiency, 
however they can also be the reason for its failures. 
 
In order to be adaptable and flexible it is necessary to understand the process completely 
i.e., not only how it can fail but also how can it go right. When we focus on how it can go 
right we get to understand the near misses as well. Near miss is defined as a situation 
which was circumvented by the performance variance of the personnel. In this view the 
factors which contributed to the near misses can also be identified.  
 
One of the main drawbacks of the oil and gas industry is that we fail to record how it went 
right. which makes it difficult in learning from the past. In Resilience engineering all the 
performances including near misses are recorded and monitored for detecting the 
performance variances. 
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In order to adopt these principles, we are in need of a model which can represent the 
variability of normal performance and that can provide more comprehensive explanations 
for the accidents to identify the possible risks.   
 
When looking in to aviation industry where safety is their main concern and priority. They 
are in need of high precision of the data and learning from the past. It is one of the 
industries which includes human factors as its major contributor of the system’s operation. 
The Air traffic management need to more accurate and also be ready for adaptability and 
flexibility at any point of time to avoid serious accidents. In the air traffic management 
system, they widely use Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM). Which helps 
them to monitor and respond accordingly without affecting the entire system. 
 
Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) over comes the intrinsic limitations of the 
commonly used methods by focusing on the relationship between the system functions. It 
also eliminates the traditional cause effect relation by the principle of resilience. FRAM can 
also be used as an accident model to find the root causes of the accident, which helps in 
better understanding of the system. 
 
A practical implementation of the FRAM method is established in the case study on 
Macondo Blowout accident. The Safety assessment model for the accident situation of 
Macondo blowout is established. The model clearly represents the dependencies and the 
relationships between the system functions. which makes the path to understand the 
normal performance and the possible performance variability clearly visible and 
accessible.  
 
In FRAM method the possible performance variabilities are identified and they are mapped 
with other functions to identify the dependencies and their effect on the system functions. 
Hence the accidents or incidents can be predicted and prevented far earlier than any other 
methods, as shown in the case study where the possibility of Blowout is predicted with the 
performance variations of the other functions.  
 
The main reason for this method to be more successful in preventing the accidents is that  
it focuses on damping the variability instead of eliminating the failures i.e., by improving 













    Master Thesis – Spring 2016                                                                                                              Page | 48  
References 
 




Arezes, P., & Carvalho, P. (Eds.). (2014). Advances in safety management and human 
factors edited by. Retrieved from http://www.ahfe2016.org/files/books/2014SMHF.pdf 
 
Aven, T. (2008). Risk analysis: Assessing uncertainties beyond expected values and 
probabilities. United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell (an imprint of John Wiley & Sons Ltd). 
 




DNV.GL. (2014). THE WORLDWIDE OFFSHORE ACCIDENT DATABANK (WOAD) THE 








Gordon, R. P. E. (1998). The contribution of human factors to accidents in the offshore oil 
industry. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 61(1-2), 95–108. doi:10.1016/s0951-
8320(98)80003-3 
 
Health and Safety Executive. (2012, January). Managing human performance - Briefing 
notes. Retrieved from http://www.hse.gov.uk/humanfactors/briefingnotes.htm 
 
Hollnagel, E. (2013, September). An application of the functional resonance analysis method 
(FRAM) to risk assessment of Organizational change. Retrieved from 
http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/44/057/44057156.pdf 
 




    Master Thesis – Spring 2016                                                                                                              Page | 49  
Hollnagel, E., Wears, R. L., & Braithwaite, J. (2015). From safety-i to Safety-II: A white 
paper. Retrieved from https://www.england.nhs.uk/signuptosafety/wp-
content/uploads/sites/16/2015/10/safety-1-safety-2-whte-papr.pdf 
 
Hubbard, A., & Embrey, D. (2010, September). Deepwater horizon – summary of critical 




IOGP. (2005, June). Human factors defined - a means of improving HSE performance. 
Retrieved from http://www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/368.pdf 
 
IOGP. (2010, March). Risk assessment data directory human factors in QRA. Retrieved from 
http://www.iogp.org/pubs/434-05.pdf 
 
IOGP. (2011, August). Human factors engineering in projects. Retrieved from 
http://www.iogp.org/pubs/454.pdf 
 
Kirwan, B. I. (1994). A guide to practical human reliability assessment. United Kingdom: 
Taylor & Francis. 
 
NOPSEMA. (2016). Human error. Retrieved April 12, 2016, from 
https://www.nopsema.gov.au/resources/human-factors/human-error/ 
 
Paries, J., Wreathall, J., & Hollnagel, P. E. (2010). Resilience engineering in practice 
(Ashgate studies in resilience engineering). United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing. 
 
Reason, J. (1997). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing. 
 
Society of Petroleum Engineering. (2014, March). The human factor: Process safety and 
culture. Retrieved from https://www.onepetro.org/general/SPE-170575-TR 
 
Steen, R., & Aven, T. (2011). A risk perspective suitable for resilience engineering. Safety 
Science, 49(2), 292–297. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925753510002237 
 




    Master Thesis – Spring 2016                                                                                                              Page | 50  
Vinnem, J. E., Aven, T., Hauge, S., Seljelid, J., & Veire, G. (2004). Integrated barrier analysis 
in operational risk assessment in offshore petroleum operations. Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment and Management. Retrieved from http://preventor.no/u/0201.pdf 
 




Pollock, R. A. (2014). Dispelling myths about human error. Retrieved from 
https://www.onepetro.org/conference-paper/ASSE-14-
631?sort=&start=0&q=myths+of+human+error&from_year=&peer_reviewed=&published
_between=&fromSearchResults=true&to_year=&rows=10# 
 
